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Comments
JUSTICES ANSWER COACH KENNEDY’S PRAYER WITH PLAY
IN THE JOINTS AUDIBLE: KENNEDY V. BREMERTON SCHOOL
DISTRICT AND PUBLIC-SCHOOL SPORTS PRAYER POST-THE
AMERICAN LEGION V. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
I. “PLAY

IN THE

JOINTS”: AN INTRODUCTION

The first words ever added to the ratified United States Constitution are “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .”1 While the
Court has recognized the “internal tension” between these two
clauses—the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses respectively,
also known as the Religion Clauses—it has nevertheless characterized the clauses’ relationship as having “play in the joints” therebetween.2 The subject of this Comment is how that “play in the
joints” manifests and, more specifically, how it operates in the context of sports in public middle and high schools as well as public
colleges and universities.3 The primary context for this assessment
is two 2019 cases: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District4 and American
Legion v. American Humanist Association.5 In the first, four members
of the Supreme Court telegraphed their willingness to address this
inter-clausal tension in a case about a potential Free Exercise claim
of a high school football coach, who his school district placed on
paid administrative leave and recommended to not rehire after
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing text of Constitution’s Religion Clauses).
2. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2019 (2017) (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004)) (decoding “play in
the joints” to convey that which is allowed under Establishment Clause is not necessarily mandatory under Free Exercise Clause); Locke, 540 U.S. at 719 (2004) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)) (“[T]here are
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the
Free Exercise Clause.”); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (asserting
“numerous” Supreme Court cases have recognized this inter-clausal tension); Walz
v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (originating Supreme
Court’s “play in the joints” phrase about Religion Clauses; reasoning this interclausal tension must be allowed some variance between intolerable poles of state
“sponsorship” and “interference”, for “rigidity” would otherwise be antithetical to
clauses’ purpose).
3. For further discussion of how this “play in the joints” has been manipulated, see infra notes 27–165 and accompanying text.
4. 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019), denying cert. to, 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017).
5. 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
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contract expiration because he had engaged in various prayers on
the job.6 In the second, the Court denied an Establishment Clause
claim about a four-story-high, cross-shaped veterans’ memorial that
came to be on state-owned land many decades after its erection.7
While these cases may, at first blush, seem to harbor an attenuated relationship at best, this Comment descriptively argues these
two cases are the latest in the Court’s narrowing of the Establishment Clause in a post-Lemon v. Kurtzman8 era and its re-broadening
of the Free Exercise Clause in a post-Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith9 era.10 This Comment goes
further by normatively arguing the Court ought to abandon these
trends and readopt its Lee v. Weisman11 formulation of the “internal
tension” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses: “the
principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed
by the Establishment Clause.”12 Part II of this Comment traces the
6. See Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 635 (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari,
joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (asserting, sua sponte, Coach Kennedy’s “live” Free Exercise Clause claim). For further discussion of Kennedy, see
infra notes 123–139 and accompanying text.
7. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (cobbling
together seven members for narrow consensus on long-standing memorials; summarizing effects of “destroying or defacing the Cross that has stood undisturbed
for nearly a century” as running counter to “neutrality[,] . . . respect and tolerance
embodied in the First Amendment”).
8. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In the process of invalidating two schema for state aid
to private school, the Lemon Court articulated a new, broad test for Establishment
Clause cases: state action must (1) “have a secular . . . purpose,” (2) “neither advance[ ] nor inhibit[ ] religion” by its “principle or primary effect,” and (3) avoid
“ ‘excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” See id. at 612–13 (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citing Bd. of Educ.
of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Smith Court handed down a narrower test for
Free Exercise cases while upholding a state’s unemployment benefits restrictions
based on illegal drug use; holding (1) the state’s criminal statute interdicting substance’s use failed to run afoul of Free Exercise Clause when use of substance was
pursuant to religious reasons because criminal interdiction was “ ‘valid and neutral
law of general applicability’ ” and, thus, (2) the state unemployment benefits
scheme conditioned on that statute also passed constitutional muster. See id. at
879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
10. For further discussion of the post-Smith re-broadening of the Free Exercise Clause, see infra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. For further discussion
of the post-Lemon narrowing of the Establishment Clause, see infra notes 71–87 and
accompanying text.
11. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In Lee—the fountainhead of the Court’s modern
school prayer jurisprudence—the Court found a public school’s graduation prayer
policy and practice unconstitutional because the “undeniable fact” of “public . . . as
well as peer pressure” accruing therefrom amounted to impermissible government
coercion. See id. at 593.
12. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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Court’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
tripartite formulations: (1) from the clauses’ selective incorporation by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to
the clauses’ touchstone case, (2) the touchstone cases themselves,
and (3) the clauses thereafter.13 The final section of Part II offers a
look at significant developments in each clause’s jurisprudence
from 2019.14 Part III offers an analysis of what the developments in
Part II portend for the future of the Court’s Religion Clauses jurisprudence, especially with regard to coaches, administrators, and
student-athletes in the context of public school sports, and argues
for a return to a previous Court’s formulation of its Religion
Clauses jurisprudence.15 This Comment concludes in Part IV with
a brief restatement of its descriptive and normative claims: while
the Court has re-broadened the Free Exercise Clause since Smith
and narrowed the Establishment Clause since Lemon, it must ultimately reverse course for public school student-athletes, coaches,
and administrators alike by re-adopting its Lee holding that the Establishment Clause shall not be sacrificed on the altar of the Free
Exercise Clause.16
II. SYNOVIAL JOINTS: A DYNAMICALLY MOVING BACKGROUND
The current Religion Clauses tests were not handed down on
stone tablets at the founding.17 Rather, the Court has grappled
with the sixteen words and one comma found in the Religion
Clauses in a litany of cases for over a century, fashioning evolving
rules that have regulated governments’ relationships with religions
as well as those religions’ practitioners and those who abstained
therefrom.18 While much of this litigation springs from facts off the
13. For further discussion of the history of the Free Exercise Clause, see infra
notes 27–53 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the history of the
Establishment Clause, see infra notes 58–116 and accompanying text.
14. For further discussion of these significant developments, see infra notes
117–165 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of the descriptive analysis of these developments
and normative argument thereabout, see infra notes 171–232 and accompanying
text.
16. For further discussion of this Comment’s conclusions, see infra notes
233–241 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (construing
Free Exercise Clause for first time, eighty-seven years after First Amendment’s ratification; upholding bigamy conviction despite challenge on, inter alia, Free Exercise grounds because even if governments may not regulate beliefs, they must still
be allowed, to some extent, to regulate practices to prevent “permit[ting] every
citizen to become a law unto himself”).
18. Compare Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (illustrating early
Court understanding of Bill of Rights—including Religions Clauses—was limited
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field and even out of the classroom, the Court’s Religion Clauses
jurisprudence nonetheless effects public school coaches and teachers, administrators, and student-athletes alike, constructing the
arena in which they are to litigate their own Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns.19 First, this section tracks and analyzes the Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence, descriptively arguing
the Court has been steadily re-broadening the Free Exercise Clause
since narrowing it in Smith.20 Second, this section turns to the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, performing a similar
analysis thereon and descriptively arguing the Court has steadily
narrowed that clause since Lemon.21 The analysis of each of these
clauses is organized around an epochal moment: each clause’s
touchstone case.22 Finally, this section concludes with an assessment of the Court’s treatment of these two clauses in its most recently completed term, which concluded in June 2019, descriptively
arguing these newest cases fit each of the aforementioned trends—
re-broadening Free Exercise Clause post-Smith and narrowing Establishment Clause post-Lemon.23

in scope to protections from federal infringement), with Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (applying one Religion Clause against states more than one century
after Barron).
19. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019)
(Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (noting high school football coach placed on paid administrative leave
and receiving administrative recommendation to not rehire due to initiating
prayers “still has live claims under the Free Exercise Clause”); Borden v. Sch. Dist.
of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 174–79 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding unconstitutional high school football coach’s participation in student-initiated prayer);
Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding
violation of Establishment Clause when middle school basketball coach’s initiated
and participated in his team’s prayers).
20. For further discussion of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, see infra
notes 27–54 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see infra
notes 58–116 and accompanying text.
22. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (articulating touchstone of Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (announcing touchstone of Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence). For further discussion of Smith, see infra notes
24–42 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Lemon, see infra notes
55–70 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the 2019 cases (Kennedy, Am. Legion, and two
death penalty stay docket cases), see infra notes 117–165 and accompanying text.
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A. Pivot Joint: An Oscillating Free Exercise Clause History
The touchstone of the Court’s modern Free Exercise jurisprudence is Smith.24 However, like a pendulum nearly swinging its full
amplitude, the Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence has swung from
relatively broad pre-Smith, to narrow in Smith, and is now swinging
back to a pre-Smith broadness once more.25 This section explores
this period of oscillation, arguing the Court has pivoted a significant magnitude, reconsidering in all but name much of Smith
already.26
1. Pre-Smith: Forming a Free Exercise Framework
Before a provision of the Bill of Rights applies against the
states, the litigation pursuant thereto is usually minimal.27 Selectively incorporating one of these provisions triggers an avalanche of
landmark decisions thereon because previously unprotected litigants are extended new rights to vindicate in court; the Free Exercise Clause follows this pattern.28 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,29 the
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For further discussion of Smith, see infra notes 37–42
and accompanying text.
25. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–09 (1963) (granting broad
challenge to state unemployment benefits refusal due to unwillingness to work on
Sabbath), with Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (narrowing Free Exercise Clause to disallow
challenge to state unemployment benefits on basis of religious use of illegal drug),
and Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25
(2017) (re-broadening Free Exercise Clause to forbid exclusion from state playground-resurfacing program “solely because of [the beneficiary’s] religious character,” especially when benefit was not, itself, religious or being used for directly
religious ends but, instead, merely protected against “a few extra scraped knees”).
These three cases are emblematic of how the Court has oscillated—from broad to
narrow and back to broad again—on the concept of “play in the joints” that the
Trinity Lutheran Court deciphered above: the gap between that which is allowed by
the Establishment Clause and required by the Free Exercise Clause. See Trinity
Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004))
(noting tension “between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels”).
26. For further discussion of this re-broadening post-Smith, see infra notes
43–54 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (construing Free
Exercise Clause for first time, eighty-seven years after First Amendment’s
ratification).
28. See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating selectively First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause). Even from this early stage, the extension of
the Free Exercise Clause to children was considered. See Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (reviewing Jehovah Witness’ conviction under child labor laws for having nine-year old niece pass out religious pamphlets); see also id. at 172 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (“Religious training and activity, whether performed by adult or child,
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by state action
. . . .”).
29. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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arrest of several Jehovah’s Witnesses for solicitation without approval led the Court to consider whether the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment ought to be incorporated against the
states; the Court answered in the affirmative.30 In the decades following the Free Exercise Clause’s incorporation, the Court interpreted it broadly.31 In Sherbert v. Verner,32 a Seventh-day Adventist
challenged a South Carolina state agency’s interpretation of a state
statute that disqualified from the pool of persons eligible for unemployment benefits persons who were not willing to work on Saturdays, the challenger’s Sabbath. 3 3 The Court announced
government action that “substantial[ly] burden[ed]” religious exercise must be justified by a compelling interest therein and that the
South Carolina statute as interpreted by the state’s agency failed to
do so, making it unconstitutional.34 The Court continued this
broad construction of the Free Exercise Clause when it vindicated
three Amish families’ challenge to a Wisconsin compulsory high
school attendance statute by holding the statute was repugnant to
their Free Exercise Clause rights.35 These cases exhibited the highwater mark of the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence; the
Court drastically narrowed the clause roughly two decades later.36
2. Smith: Articulating the Free Exercise Test, Narrowing Significantly
the Free Exercise Clause
In Smith, the Court dramatically retreated from the position it
had held in its previous Free Exercise Clause cases such as Sherbert,
exempting from the Sherbert Court’s compelling interest and substantial burden test “ ‘neutral law[s] of general applicability,’ ”
which framed a much narrower conception of the Free Exercise
30. See id. at 303–04 (holding Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
applies Free Exercise Clause’s “fundamental concept of liberty” against states).
31. See, e.g., Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (regarding challenge to compulsory high school attendance by Amish); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(concerning challenge by Seventh-day Adventist to disqualification of unemployment benefits).
32. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. See id. at 399–401 (describing challenger’s religious objections and state’s
administrative process and denial of benefits).
34. See id. at 406–09 (finding no sufficiently compelling interest).
35. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234–36 (emphasizing long Amish history and permissible proffered alternative thereby).
36. See Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (narrowing Free Exercise Clause significantly by coming out dissimilarly in
case similar to Sherbert).
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Clause that was less stringent on the government.37 In Smith, members of the Native American Church were terminated after they
tested positive for the hallucinogenic cactus peyote, which they had
ingested for religious purposes; this caused the state employment
agency to classify their termination as caused by “misconduct,” disallowing them unemployment benefits.38 The Court distinguished
Smith from Sherbert, where a state employment agency’s interpretation of an employment statute led to disqualification for benefits,
by situating the law at issue as the underlying law that criminalized
peyote—not the agency’s interpretation of “misconduct.”39 Then,
the Court applied Smith’s new “neutral law of general applicability”
test to the controlled substances criminal statute to find the denial
of benefits constitutionally permissible.40 By carving out from the
rigors of the compelling interest test state action that met the modest standard of “neutral laws of general applicability,” the Smith
Court drastically rolled back Free Exercise protections, giving legislatures a blueprint by which they could, if so desiring, limit Free
Exercise.41 As a result, the Court constitutionally incentivized criminal prohibitions on religious conduct if cloaked in sufficiently sizeable statutory strokes.42
3. Post-Smith: Recent, Steady Re-broadening of Narrowed Free-Exercise
Test
Following Smith, the Court steadily re-broadened the Free Exercise Clause, which suggests some student-athletes and coaches
seeking religious exercise may, now, have a more accessible defense
to administrator action.43 Soon after Smith, the Court took up a
37. See id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)) (synthesizing different, more permissive test from nonSherbert cases).
38. See id. at 874–75 (recounting challengers’ use of peyote, Oregon’s relevant employment and criminal law, as well as relevant federal criminal law).
39. See id. at 884–86 (distinguishing Sherbert from instant case, rejecting compelling interest test, and declining to extend Sherbert’s Free Exercise protection to
conduct criminal statute had prohibited).
40. See id. at 879, 885–86 (assessing Oregon law as “an across-the-board criminal
prohibition on a particular form of conduct”) (emphasis added).
41. For further discussion of how government actors attempted to use Smith
to carry their Free-Exercise-limiting freight, see infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
42. For discussion of uncertainty Smith still causes today and appetite for reconsideration thereof, see infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n., 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (rejecting animus found in state civil rights commission’s hearing for
baker who refused to bake specifically for same-sex wedding); Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (challenging state’s
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challenge to an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice if not intended for consumption.44 The Court found the ordinance impermissibly infringed on the Free Exercise rights of members of the
Santeria religion who practice as a religious rite animal sacrifice because the ordinance failed to meet Smith’s constitutional requirements of neutrality and general applicability.45 Despite the
Santeria church’s triumph at the Court, Congress, in response to
the Smith Court lowering the standard by which Free Exercise
claims are assessed from a compelling interest and substantial burden test to one permitting neutral laws of general applicability,
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which purported to raise the same standard to strict scrutiny, an extremely
less deferential tier of review.46 However, the Court soon struck
down RFRA as it applied to the states, so while RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard as against the federal government remained in place,
the states were bound, again, only by Smith.47 Although Smith still
policy of excluding religious institutions from public funding for playgrounds);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (seeking building permit for expansion of urban Catholic church after being denied); Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (arguing against city ordinance proscribing ritual animal slaughter).
44. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 527 (indicating ordinance
limits is proscription “to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal
in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption”).
45. See id. at 545–46 (finding city, via ordinance at issue, unconstitutionally
targeted its Santeria members as opposed to promulgating ordinance that would
have affected other acts of animal slaughter as well (i.e. one that was not facially
underinclusive)).
46. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–13 (detailing how Congress reacted to
Smith).
47. See id. at 520 (establishing “congruence and proportionality” test for assessing congressional action taken pursuant to Amendment XIV § 5 power). Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with “the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of th[e Amendment].” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 5 (providing Congress’s legislative enforcement power). A
recent phenomenon in California, which lacks a state analogue to RFRA, that highlights the fallout of Boerne (and Smith) is the establishment of cannabis churches,
such as Jah Healing Kemetic Temple of the Divine, that claim cannabis as a sacrament—the practice of which would otherwise violate a neutral law of general applicability. See Arit John, Inside the War for California’s Cannabis Churches, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/23/style/weed-church-california.html [https://perma.cc/XP38-ECJH?type=image] (reporting on one of
many cannabis churches facing accusations of acting as illegal dispensaries by state
district attorneys from whom RFRA provides no protection post-Boerne). While this
Comment was being drafted, the Court granted the writ of certiorari in another
RFRA case, which presents the question whether RFRA allows plaintiffs to seek
monetary relief (damages) when the defendant is one or more federal employees.
See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 894 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 550 (2019)
(arising from Muslim men seeking damages against FBI agents who placed men on
“No Fly List” and threatened deportation when men declined to act as infor-
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governs in claims levied against state infringements on religious liberty, RFRA still remains potent against those by the federal government and, in fact, has accounted for the litigation success of, inter
alia, a church that challenged the federal government’s seizure of,
and threat of prosecution for, the hallucinogenic hoasca tea that
church members ingested as a sacrament during communion and
contained a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances
Act.48
Recently, the Court continued its march toward a broader Free
Exercise Clause when it ruled a policy excluding, per se, religious
institutions from a playground resurfacing fund ran afoul of the
Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.49 While a plurality of
the Court explicitly limited that holding to “playground resurfacing,” the Court, in January 2020, heard argument in a case that
could serve as a vehicle to extend that holding therebeyond as early
as May or June 2020—the Court’s opinion had not been published
when this Comment went to print.50 In one of its latest and highmants). Commentators have argued this case presents a conflict in the current
political binary because a win for Tanvir could mean other RFRA plaintiffs, which
have often been members of the so-called “Christian right” such as Hobby Lobby
in Burwell; put another way, “the biggest winner is unlikely to be religious minorities like Tanvir. Rather, the biggest winner is likely to be the Christian right.” See
Ian Millhiser, A Heartbreaking Supreme Court Case Could be a Huge Win for the Christian
Right, VOX MEDIA (Nov. 26, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/11/26/20982273/supreme-court-religion-tanvir-tanzin-rfra [https:/
/perma.cc/95C4-6HXC].
48. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espı́rita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006) (holding RFRA protected church members from prosecution for religious use of tea made from two Amazonian plants—one of which consisted, in part,
of dimethyltryptamine, Schedule I drug under Controlled Substances Act). Recall,
while this case presents as almost a post-RFRA Smith, that case involved an Oregon
criminal statute and unemployment benefits scheme, so RFRA would offer similarly situated litigants no protection post-Boerne. Compare id. (disallowing federal
government’s prohibition on ayahuasca), with Employment Div., Dep’t of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (permitting state’s neutral law of general
applicability on peyote and unemployment benefits conditioned thereon).
49. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2025 (2017) (denominating Missouri Department of Natural Resources policy
“odious to our Constitution” despite “a few extra scraped knees” being likely impacted otherwise).
50. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019) (granting
cert. in case about state tax credit fund-matching program that resulted in money
to sectarian schools); Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, OYEZ, https://
www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1195 [https://perma.cc/7CFD-ALSN] (last visited
May 10, 2020) (providing oral argument audio recording synced with transcript);
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3 (narrowing scope of holding exclusively to
“playground resurfacing”). This potential extension of Trinity Lutheran has already
begun in the Executive Branch, where the Department of Education recently
claimed a proposed rule that would expand some of the Department’s grants’ eligibility to more “faith-based entities” was in response to the Court’s Trinity Lutheran

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

9

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

216

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27: p. 207

est-profile broadenings of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
found a state’s civil rights commission expressed impermissible religious animus—violating Smith’s clarion call for neutrality—toward
a baker who refused to bake a cake specifically for a same-sex wedding.51 Remarkably, both of these latest developments in the
Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence enjoyed broad support, counting seven members of the Court signing on to the majority opinion
or concurring in the judgment.52
In the almost thirty years since Smith, the Court has, through
the above cases, steadily broadened the Smith-constricted Free Exercise Clause; however, while Smith is still the touchstone of Free Exercise jurisprudence, that may not be the case for much longer.53
The Court’s Free-Exercise-broadening trend has made it easier for
student-athletes and coaches to use the Free Exercise Clause as a
shield to defend against administrative action, worsening correlatively the chances of success of other student-athletes and coaches
filing Establishment Clause claims against the very same religious
holding. See Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, Direct Grant Programs, State-Administered
Formula Grant Programs, Developing Hispanic-Serving Institutions Program, and
Strengthening Institutions Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 3190 (proposed Jan. 17, 2020)
(to be codified at 2 C.F.R. pt. 3474, 34 C.F.R. pt. 75–76, 106, 606–09) (proposing
clarification of eligibility of “faith-based organizations” and subsequent retention
of “autonomy, right of expression, religious character, and independence from
Federal, State, and local governments” should grant be awarded).
51. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1729–31 (2018) (exemplifying Herculean power of Smith’s neutrality requirement). By settling on an anti-“hostility” rationale for invalidating the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission’s decision (as opposed to deciding whether the baker’s
underlying conduct was constitutional), the six-member majority avoided passing
on whether the baker’s Free Exercise claim would have succeeded in the absence
of the Commission’s animus. See id. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in
other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts . . . .”).
52. See id. at 1722 (reporting seven justices who agreed with judgment); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2016 (reporting seven justices who
agreed with judgment). Whether such a coalition will endure may soon be tested
as a petition for certiorari in a case, which was originally vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Masterpiece, has been filed and distributed for conference. See Wash. v. Arlene Flowers, 441 P.3d 1203 (2019), petition for cert. filed (No.
19-333, Sept. 12, 2019).
53. See Fulton v. City of Phila., 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020), granting cert. to, 922 F.3d
140 (3d Cir. 2019) (providing Court opportunity to reconsider Smith via challenge
to city’s conditions on eligibility for foster care participation to which religious
agency objected on religious grounds); see also Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Bd., 435
P.3d 1 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2019) (concerning
challenge to state agency’s denial of contractor license to applicant who refused to
comply with request for Social Security Number (SSN) because he believed SSNs
are “a form of the mark, and in substance (essence) the number of the 2-horned
best written of in the Holy Bible”). For further discussion of potential reconsideration and demise of Smith, see infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
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activity, which is at stake in any political discourse about Free Exercise as well.54
B. Hinge Joint: An Establishment Clause History Bending Close
The touchstone of the Court’s modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is Lemon v. Kurtzman.55 However, like an open door
creaking towards its close, the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has narrowed from its relative openness in Lemon and
before to barely ajar.56 This section surveys this steadily closing
hinge, paying special attention to school-related Establishment
Clause claims in the fourth and fifth sub-sections, and argues the
Court has significantly retreated from Lemon, bending close the
availability of Establishment Clause remedies that will include, for
example, fewer protections, for students seeking to be free of a
coach’s Free Exercise or a weaker basis for administrative action
thereagainst.57
54. For further discussion of the impact of this trend on student-athletes,
coaches, and administrators in public schools, see infra notes 171–232 and accompanying text. This judicial trend has affected Executive Branch instruction from
the Department of Education to state and local agencies regarding school prayer
in a variety of contexts, including “[d]uring [n]on-instructional [t]ime;” by
“[t]eachers, [a]dministrators, and [o]ther [s]chool [e]mployees;” and “at
[g]raduation.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer and
Religious Expression in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools (Jan. 16, 2020) https://
www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/religionandschools/prayer_guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/6R5E-FNXW] (purporting to, inter alia, “clarif[y] the extent to
which prayer in public schools is legally protected” in nine “particular contexts”).
See also Updated Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer and Religious Exercises in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 85 Fed. Reg. 3257–72 (Jan.
21, 2020) (publishing guidance as official Rule). Several of the Court’s members
have cautioned “turning the First Amendment into a sword[ ] and using it against
workaday economic and regulatory policy . . . in such an aggressive way” in the
Free Speech Clause context, and there is no reason to believe such caution would
not equally be applied by those Justices in the Free Exercise Clause context. Janus
v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan,
J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (sounding alarm
against weaponization of First Amendment against regulations).
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For further discussion of Lemon, see infra notes
65–70 and accompanying text.
56. Compare Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down school prayer
statutes and practices broadly), with Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (building on broad
foundation to articulate broad test for Establishment Clause), and Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (narrowing Establishment Clause to not cover Ten
Commandments statue on state capitol grounds by rejecting Lemon for “passive”
memorials and monuments and embracing, instead, test based on “Nation’s history” and “nature of the monument”).
57. For further discussion of this post-Lemon narrowing, see infra notes 71–87
and accompanying text. For further discussion of Establishment Clause operating
in schools, see infra notes 89–116 and accompanying notes.
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1. Pre-Lemon: Forming the Framework for a Broad Establishment
Clause
In the same manner Cantwell’s incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause opened the possibilities for suits thereon, the selective
incorporation of the Establishment Clause provided for precedentbuilding-jurisprudence theorizing for religious liberty litigants as
well.58 The Court upheld the constitutionality of a neutral New
Jersey law of general applicability that provided for public funding
of all schoolchildren’s transportation costs to schools—including to
parochial ones—but, in the process, had to first reach the question
of whether the Establishment Clause applied against the states,
which it answered affirmatively.59 As will be discussed further below, schools remained hotbeds for Establishment Clause litigation.60 Two of the most notable instances of this litigation were
concerned with the challenges to daily, school-sponsored, religious
programming during schooldays.61 First, the Court took up and
struck down daily, state-sponsored, and God-invoking prayer in
schools.62 Then, it invalidated state-mandated, daily Bible readings
and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer in schools.63 In each of these
cases, the Court broadened the Establishment Clause to encompass
more protections against state-imposed religious activity, laying the
foundation for the impending touchstone Establishment Clause
case: Lemon.64

58. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp. , 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating selectively First Amendment’s Establishment Clause when affirming New Jersey
court of last resort’s invalidation of statute that permitted state reimbursement via
tax revenue of parochial school students’ busing costs).
59. See id. at 15–17 (concluding Establishment Clause requires only neutrality
and that New Jersey cleared that bar).
60. For further discussion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in schools,
see infra notes 93–112 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(regarding challenge to school bible readings and prayer recitation); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (discussing constitutionality of school prayer).
62. See Engle, 370 U.S. at 424. For further discussion of Engel, see infra note
100 and accompanying text.
63. See Shempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (highlighting, and finding constitutionally infirm, coercive nature of Bible reading and prayer recitation statutes).
64. See, e.g., id. at 225 (arguing for broad Establishment Clause that imposes
stringent neutrality by writing, “[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent”).
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2. Lemon: Articulating a New Test
In Lemon, the Court synthesized its Establishment Clause precedent and formulated a new test to govern the jurisprudential area.65
The test has three parts: the challenged government action must
have (1) “a secular legislative purpose,” (2) a “principle or primary
effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) an
absence of “ ‘excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ”66
At issue in Lemon were a Rhode Island and a Pennsylvania program
that appropriated state funds to non-public schools to improve the
quality of education therein by paying for instructional materials
and salary supplements.67 While the Court found no sectarian purpose and passed on the “effect” prong’s line-drawing inquiry, it
held the states’ programs presented an “excessive . . . entanglement
with religion” and, thus, violated the Establishment Clause.68 While
passing on the second prong provided future Courts an opportunity to mold that prong in their own image, the Lemon test, after
hanging on for nearly fifty years in a relatively volatile area of constitutional law, increasingly started to fall out of favor with many on
the Court, especially the conservatives.69 Those on the Court with
whom Lemon has fallen out of favor have successfully narrowed the
Establishment Clause considerably since 1971 and, as will be discussed further below, now seek to ring its death knell and usher in
some vehicle that will facilitate even further constriction of the already anemic clause.70
3. Post-Lemon: Narrowing the Establishment Clause
In the years following Lemon, it has remained, at least until
2019, the perfunctory test in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which means all students attempting to use the Clause as
a shield against school-endorsed religion must run through Lemon
65. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (presenting new test as
natural outflow from Court precedent).
66. See id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Ctr. Sch. Dist. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968)) (synthesizing Establishment Clause precedent into one, three-part test).
67. See id. at 607, 609 (detailing specific qualifications for reception of public
funds by private schools pursuant to each statutory scheme).
68. See id. at 613–14 (supporting both states’ efforts at creating secular-purposed solutions, passing on effect prong, and, finally, rejecting both statutes as
excessively entangling public and private).
69. For further discussion of one of the most recent displays of the conservative justices’ overwhelming disdain of Lemon, see infra notes 140–148 and accompanying text.
70. For further discussion of Lemon’s current state, see infra notes 144–147
and accompanying text.
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despite the test being characterized disapprovingly by many on the
Court.71 These varying levels of support for the test have led the
Court through repeated encounters with the Establishment Clause
to add significant gloss thereto—even re-adopting pre-Lemon
gloss—as it encounters new and unexpected challenges and new
Justices have fresh opportunities to tinker with Lemon, narrowing
the clause over time.72 One of the more litigated fact patterns in
post-Lemon suits is that of religious displays.73 In a pair of 1980s
cases before the court five years apart, holiday displays were at issue.74 In the first of this duo, Lynch v. Donnelly,75 the Court allowed
a Rhode Island city’s nativity scene to remain on display, finding no
Establishment Clause violation due to compliance with Lemon’s
three factors.76 The latter of the duo, County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union,77 however, saw the Court invalidating Pittsburgh’s nativity scene as violative of the Establishment Clause primarily as a result of not passing muster with regard to the second
Lemon prong, effect, because it appeared—without any secular
counterpart—at the foot of the courthouse’s grand staircase along71. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again . . . .”); Van Orden v. Perry, 546 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (“Whatever may be the
fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
erected on its Capitol grounds.”).
72. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (announcing “ ‘there is room
for play in the joints’ ” even in post-Lemon era (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 669)).
73. See, e.g., McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (determining Establishment Clause implications of Ten Commandments
display in Kentucky courthouse); Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (analyzing constitutionality of Ten Commandments statue on Texas state capitol grounds); Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (regarding Pittsburgh’s
holiday display of multiple holidays); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (concerning Rhode Island city’s display of nativity scene).
74. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (reporting on city’s holiday display on privately
owned land as menagerie of, inter alia, crèche, reindeer, elephant, teddy bear,
clown, Santa, Christmas tree and “Season’s Greetings” banner); Cty. of Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 579, 581, 587 (recounting city’s holiday display on grand staircase of
courthouse as crèche owned and set up by Catholic organization with “Gloria in
excelsis deo” banner and, one block away, forty-five-feet tall Christmas tree, eighteen-feet tall menorah, and sign proclaiming liberty).
75. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
76. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681–85 (finding secular purpose, lack of effect of
advancement of religion, and absence of excessive entanglement therewith when
purpose is to “recognize historical origins of . . . traditional event long recognized
as a National holiday,” effect is merely “indirect, remote and incidental,” and entanglement economically “de minimus” and politically without “divisiveness”).
77. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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side a banner proclaiming, in Latin, “Glory to God in the Highest.”78 However, the Court allowed Pittsburgh to continue
displaying its less intrusive and relatively more inclusive holiday display that also had secular elements, underscoring the significance
the Court places on context when it deploys Lemon’s effect prong to
evaluate a religious display.79 Comparing these two religious holiday display cases decided with so few intervening years illustrates
the Court’s fact-specific emphasis on setting and level of endorsement as key factors in determining Lemon’s effect prong for religious display cases.80
Two decades later, the Court preserved this emphasis in another duo of cases; these two were about the display of the Ten
Commandments on state property, were handed down on the same
day, and, similar to the Court’s bi-directional outcomes in the holiday display cases above, resulted in different conclusions of constitutionality from the Court.81 In McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union,82 where the Ten Commandments were in gilded
frames on display in prominent locations in Kentucky county courthouses, the Court ruled the Establishment Clause had been violated
and, thus, that the Ten Commandments must be removed.83 In
Van Orden v. Perry,84 where a Texas monument was outside and
among other monuments and indicators of historical events, the
Court allowed the monument to stand, and a plurality thereof rejected the archetypal Lemon test for static, religious displays and focused, instead, on history and the display’s characteristics.85
The inability of this plurality to garner support of an additional
colleague allowed the uncertainty surrounding Lemon’s application
to religious monuments to linger fourteen more years before the
78. See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598, 601–02 (prohibiting city from stamping with its imprimatur an “undeniably religious” and “patently Christian message:
Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ”).
79. See id. at 621 (placing particular emphasis on space in which displays reside in deciding Establishment Clause was not violated).
80. For further discussion of displays’ differences, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (regarding six-by-three-andone-half-foot Ten Commandments monument among thirty-seven other markers
around Texas state capitals twenty-two-acre grounds); McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (concerning two, Kentucky county courthouses displaying inside “large, gold-framed” facsimile of Ten Commandments).
82. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
83. See id. at 873–74 (upholding preliminary injunction against Kentucky
courthouses’ Ten Commandments displays due to first prong of Lemon: purpose).
84. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
85. See id. at 687 (plurality opinion) (passing on Lemon’s overall fate on way to
roundly rejecting Lemon for religious monument assessment).
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Court accepted the plurality’s position.86 Remarkably, this duo, McCreary County and Van Orden, paralleled the last, Lynch and County of
Allegheny: the setting was dispositive, endorsement level was central,
and the Establishment Clause was more narrow than originally announced.87 This Establishment-Clause-narrowing trend has not
only made it harder for student-athletes to use the Establishment
Clause as a shield to defend against impermissible religious action
by coaches and administrators but also has altered the calculus of
administrators attempting to delicately balance, for example,
coaches’ Free Exercise rights with students’ Establishment Clause
ones, making it correlatively easier to successfully bring Free Exercise claims against the very same religious activity.88
4. Establishment Clause in Public Schools Generally
The Court has cultivated a related but somewhat distinct jurisprudence for the application of the Religion Clauses in public
schools, which draws on the definition of students’ general rights
therein.89 Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Court’s
declaration that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,” asserting the right did “not
embrace merely classroom hours” where students are “supervised”
and dialogue is “ordained” but rather extended to other venues including “on the playing field” and “even to controversial subjects.”90
86. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (coalescing
support of seven justices for Lemon’s inapplicability to long-standing memorials).
For further discussion this limitation on Lemon, see infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
87. For further discussion of display similarities, see supra notes 74, 81 and
accompanying text.
88. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2017)
(reporting tension between administrators’ constitutional obligations). Such a balancing act was at issue in the first of this Comment’s titular cases, Kennedy v.
Bremerton School District, where Bremerton School District officials were left to ascertain an appropriate course of action when Coach Kennedy’s Free Exercise rights
collided with students’ Establishment Clause rights. See id. at 817–20. For further
discussion of the impact of this trend on student-athletes, coaches, and administrators in public schools, see infra notes 171–232 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (ensuring students’ right to express in school their opposition to Vietnam War); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (preserving students’ religious
objection to compulsory flag salute at school).
90. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 512–13 (asserting existence of fifty years of Court
precedent supporting claim; declaring students’ rights at school are not confined
to uncontroversial subjects or within classroom walls). While asserting broad subject matter and venue ambits of students’ rights, the Court also recognized there
were some subject matter restrictions on those rights: conduct that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
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Similarly, the previous year marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of
the Court overruling its precedent, holding as repugnant to the
Constitution a compulsory flag salute and pledge statute—enforced
in schools—by a related declaration that “[i]f there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.”91 Ever since these now-famous pronouncements, the Court has recognized public schools as hotbeds
for the clashing of constitutional rights, particularly of competing
First Amendment interests.92 However, this litigation hotbed has
not always been a consistent one, morphing and retreating even to
the point of the Supreme Court overruling itself over the course of
only twelve years.93
What is more, is that school Establishment Clause cases are not
always cut and dry with isolated issues cleavable from other multifaceted legal questions, leaving this particular area of the law intricate at best and convoluted at worse.94 This mess, however, also
elucidates a key characteristic of this area of the law: it is not a matter of who possesses which right but rather whose interest therein
outweighs whom.95 In schools, this weighing endeavor, between a
student’s Establishment Clause rights and a coach’s Free Exercise
rights for example, is the onerous job of administrators, whose calculations are made in reference to both the Supreme Court’s jurisis, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.” Id. at 513.
91. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (situating as First Amendment’s paramount protected matters—even for schoolchildren—“the sphere of intellect and spirit”).
92. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (permitting “reasonable” administrator oversight of publication decisions of student articles in school newspaper as it was limited public forum); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986) (allowing for school-imposed punishments for prurient student speech at school due to speech’s “disrupti[on] of the educational process”).
93. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (overruling precedent regarding public school teachers
staffing parochial schools after all but one member of original majority had retired); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002) (broadening Agostini to uphold as Lemon-compatible Cleveland school voucher program that
resulted in ninety-six percent of voucher-receivers applying funds to religious
schools); but see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (reversing course again to
allow state refusal to fund student aid for theology program).
94. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112–19
(2001) (analyzing attempted Establishment Clause defense to viewpoint
discrimination).
95. See id. (illustrating freight carried by interest weighing at intersection of
competing First Amendment rights even when parties’ claims are grounded in
same amendment).
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prudence and to the Circuit’s precedent interpreting and filling in
the gaps of the Supreme Court’s relevant case law.96
High schools and middle schools are not the only setting from
which these suits arise; advocates for and those against religious activity at public universities have also commenced similar challenges.97 When a federal provision of construction funding for
colleges and universities was appropriated to several “church-related” colleges contingent on twenty-years of secular building usage, the Court struck down the building-use contingency, pointing
out (1) older students are less likely to be susceptible to religious
indoctrination, (2) religious indoctrination was not the purpose of
the institutions of higher education at issue, and (3) the discrete
nature of construction funding lessens potential entanglement between government and religion.98 When compared to other analogous cases, it is apparent the Court weighs heavily—and, more
importantly, as dispositive—fact-specific inquiries when assessing alleged Establishment Clause infringements.99
96. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir.
2017) (recounting administrators’ balancing act between their constitutional obligations to allow Coach Kennedy’s Free Exercise without exhibiting endorsement
thereto rising to Establishment Clause violation); see also id. at 822 (summarizing
Ninth Circuit’s application of relevant Circuit Establishment Clause precedent,
Eng v. Cooley, that allowed it to “decline to reach” Coach Kennedy’s Establishment
Clause claim as such); see generally, Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 360 (9th Cir. 2009)
(providing Ninth Circuit five-factor framework for First Amendment Retaliation
claims, including dispositive factor in Kennedy: whether spoken by private citizen or
public employee).
97. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (considering punitive
measures, as provided by Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, against “churchrelated” higher education institutions after using federal construction funds).
98. See id. at 684–89 (distinguishing from more susceptible students in parochial schools with more than one-time interaction with government-funded resources in Lemon).
99. Compare id. (suggesting, and finding dispositive, younger students are
more impressionable than their collegiate counterparts), with Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (presuming adults in Nebraska State Legislature are
more mature than schoolchildren and, therefore, less “susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination’ ” (quoting Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686)), and Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (recounting precedent holding coercion rationale
weakens disputatively when audience is adults, not children). See also Tilton, 403
U.S. at 688–89 (assessing constitutional challenge by holistically considering all
fact-sensitive factors). While the Marsh presumption that adults are less likely to
fall prey to attempted religious indoctrination and coercion and subsequent emphasis of this point in Town of Greece were both handed down in legislative prayer
cases, the Court’s recognition of a potentially dispositive difference between children and adults may indicate the Court would also be more permissive of, for
example, coaches’ on-the-job religious behavior around adult, college student-athletes than it might be when the same is around children, middle- or high-school
student-athletes. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (reasoning adults are “presumably not
readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination’ or peer pressure”) (internal cita-
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While the aforementioned constitutional competitions were
concerned with student protests, parochial use of public resources,
and building use, this area of litigation has most notably—or at
least most relevantly—extended to the realm of prayer in public
schools, starting in earnest with the landmark removal of daily,
state-sponsored, and God-invoking prayer from schools.100 Since
that time, litigants have brought to the Court a number of permutations of public school prayer cases, starting with a challenge to Alabama’s attempted replacement to the more explicit practice the
Engle Court struck down: daily silent periods.101 Like the administration-initiated prayer in Engle, this, too, was likewise held to be at
odds with the Establishment Clause because of its failure to pass the
first prong of the Lemon test: secular purpose.102 Initiating prayer
for a sectarian purpose is not the only constitutionally problematic
avenue down which an administrator may stray, for the second and
third Lemon prongs—effect of advancing or inhibiting religion and
excessive entanglement—can each also prove constitutionally fatal.103 The above precedent lays the broad foundation for regulation of state officials specifically tailored for the context of public
schools at all educational levels, attempting to balance the multiple—and often conflicting—interests of schools’ many stakeholders
and providing the basis for further development of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence outside the classroom as well.104

tion omitted); see also Town of Greece, N.Y., 572 U.S. at 590 (reiterating Marsh’s lesssusceptible-adult presumption).
100. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422, 424 (1962) (invalidating as “a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause” New York policy of decreed
daily prayer, which read, “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country”).
101. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (describing Alabama statutes, which required in every public-school daily sixty-second pauses for “meditation or voluntary prayer”).
102. See id. at 56 (observing absence of secular purpose by underscoring statute’s provision of words for prayer). The prayer invoked “Almighty God . . . Creator and Supreme Judge of the world” as prescribed by statute. ALA. CODE § 16-120.2 (1975).
103. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590, 599 (1992) (recognizing Establishment Clause violation due to state’s coercive power being brought to bear on vulnerable students as well as state’s imprimatur via significant involvement in
graduation prayer).
104. For further discussion of how this further development occurs in the
context of, as the Tinker Court put it, “on the playing field,” see infra notes 105–116
and accompanying text.
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5. Establishment Clause in Public School Sports
It is on the above tailored foundation a further jurisprudential
subset has begun to arise and take shape: the Establishment Clause
in the context of public school sports.105 While focus of the general
Establishment-Clause-in-public-school jurisprudence has been administrator-initiated prayer, when the venue shifts to sports, student- or coach-initiated prayer emerges as the focus.106 There,
despite the prayer not being administrator-initiated, the Court still
disallowed the public-school prayer practice.107 Even though students initiated the prayer, the Court held the school’s mere broadcast thereof conveyed sponsorship by the school, unconstitutionally
coercing those in attendance.108
While coach-involved prayer has yet to be fully considered by
the Court, several Circuit Courts of Appeals have weighed in
thereon.109 The Third Circuit held a high school football coach
105. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional high school policy and practice for student-led prayer at football
games); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist.,
624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010) (denying to extend Tinker’s to conversion of teachers
to both “employer and employee”); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 174–79 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining high school football
coach’s participation in student-initiated prayer was repugnant to Establishment
Clause); Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007)
(framing teacher-school relationship as one in which school district “hires” teacher
speech rather than regulating it); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d
402, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling middle school basketball coach’s initiation of
and participation in his team’s prayers infringed on their Establishment Clause
rights).
106. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294 (detailing how Texas high school allowance of prayer by students before kickoff of its football games caused “Santa Fe
High School student[s] [to] unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame
prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval”). The Court also emphasized
that by permitting the prayer to be given by the same student at every game and
allowing the students to popularly elect that person, the school “guarantees, by
definition, that minority candidates [for the student chaplain position] will never
prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced.” See id. at 291, 304–05
(quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
(“[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”)).
107. See id. at 313 (explaining even student-initiated prayer runs afoul of Establishment Clause jurisprudence when impermissibly endorsed by government).
108. See id. at 312 (acknowledging counterfactual where every students’ attendance was voluntary and dismissing that, too, as impermissibly coercive).
109. See, e.g., Borden, 523 F.3d at 174–79 (determining high school football
coach’s participation in student-initiated prayer was repugnant to Establishment
Clause); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1995)
(ruling, inter alia, middle school basketball coach’s initiation of and participation
in his team’s prayers infringed on their Establishment Clause rights). For further
discussion of teachers’ First Amendment rights outside of prayer context, see Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332
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violated the Establishment Clause when he silently bowed his head
during his football team’s prayer for their pre-game meal and knelt
with his team in the locker room during an additional pre-game
prayer.110 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held a middle school basketball coach also violated the Establishment Clause when he initiated
and participated in his team’s prayers.111 The Court has yet to
grant a writ of certiorari to one of these coach-initiated prayer
cases, but it appears poised to do so in the not-so-distant future.112
Upon zooming out to examine the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence as a whole in June 2018, two members of the
Court went as far as to assert the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”113 In a dissent from the denial of the
grant of certiorari, Justice Thomas joined by Justice Gorsuch argued the Court had been inconsistent in its approach to Establishment Clause cases, frustrating the administration of justice in lower
courts by embracing a mercurial jurisprudence over a uniform
one.114 Describing the Fourth Circuit’s holding in a legislative
(6th Cir. 2010) (denying to extend Tinker’s to conversion of teachers to both “employer and employee”) and Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477
(7th Cir. 2007) (framing teacher-school relationship as one in which school district “hires” teacher speech rather than regulating it). Although the Court has yet
to give sustained examination to coach-involved prayer, the Department of Education published a guidance asserting teachers, administrators and other school employees are “prohibited by the First Amendment . . . from actively participating in
[prayer] with students” unless “the overall context makes clear that they are not
participating in their official capacities” or when undertaken “at a time when it is
permissible to engage in other private conduct such as making a personal telephone call.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer and
Religious Expression in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools (Jan. 16, 2020) https://
www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/religionandschools/prayer_guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/6R5E-FNXW] (updating Executive Branch secondary-and-below level public school religious expression).
110. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at
308) (denouncing coach’s behavior as violative of Supreme Court’s endorsement
test).
111. See Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 406–07 (distinguishing facts
from Fifth Circuit precedent about high school graduation prayer by highlighting,
here in middle school basketball games, younger age of students and dramatically
decreased solemnity and frequency of occasion); but cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 599 (1992) (asserting even high school graduation prayer may be, and was
there, unconstitutional).
112. For further discussion of the possibility of writ of certiorari grant in
coach-initiated prayer case, see infra notes 123–139 and accompanying text.
113. Rowan County, N.C. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Gorsuch, J.).
114. See id. (highlighting Court’s fluctuating emphasis on endorsement
through eyes of “ ‘reasonable observer[s]’ ” at times and national “history and tradition” at others); see also Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2100
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) (noting another example
of Court’s “deeply inconsistent” Establishment Clause jurisprudence—“offended
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prayer case as “unfaithful to [the Supreme Court’s] precedent,” Justice Thomas wrote the Court ought to have granted certiorari to
clarify the apparent precedential ambiguity that led the Fourth Circuit to disallow non-federal legislative prayer by members of those
bodies while the Sixth Circuit permits the same.115 This belief in
jurisprudential “disarray” by two members of the Court foreshadowed the Establishment Clause actions by a Court majority in the
year that followed.116
C. Saddle Joints: Religion Clause Cases in October Term 2018
Riding the Trend
In the concluding five months of the Court’s October Term
2018, both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses saw from
the Court significant and sustained engagement, which this Comment addresses in turn below.117 In January 2019, the Court first
engaged the Free Exercise Clause in a case about the placing on
paid administrative leave and recommendation to not rehire after
contract expiration of a high school football coach, who prayed
publicly following each game.118 It then took on the Establishment
Clause on both its certiorari and stay dockets.119 February and
March saw each of the stay docket’s interactions with the Establishment Clause in turn, confronting the Court with challenges to the
denial of the presence in the execution chamber of a spiritual adviobserver standing,” which enabled plaintiffs in American Legion to sue—dubbing it
“the anomaly” “lower courts invented” and calling for its abolition).
115. See Lund, 138 S. Ct. at 2566–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari, joined by Gorsuch, J.) (citing Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d
494 (6th Cir. 2017)) (arguing for review to resolve Circuit split).
116. For further discussion of Court’s foreshadowed subsequent reformulations of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 140–148 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (narrowing Establishment Clause);
Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019) (reversing denial of execution stay on
Establishment Clause grounds), rev’g, 919 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2019); Dunn v. Ray,
139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (vacating execution stay on Establishment Clause grounds),
rev’g, 915 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2019); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct.
634 (2019) (broadening Free Exercise Clause).
118. See Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 635 (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari,
joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (asserting live Free Exercise
claim despite no such claim in complaint).
119. See generally Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (reviewing Establishment Clause
claim on certiorari docket); Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (reviewing Establishment
Clause claim on stay docket); Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (reviewing Establishment Clause
claim on stay docket).
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sor of the soon-to-be executed person’s own religion.120 On its certiorari docket, the Court addressed whether a veterans’ memorial
on public land in the shape of a Latin cross violated the Establishment Clause.121 This section argues the post-Smith re-broadening
and post-Lemon narrowing trends described in the above sections
continued in the Court’s most recent completed term, which concluded in June 2019, where the Court not only did not provide any
reason for observers to believe these trends would be stymied but
also reified the certainty the trends would continue.122
1. Coach-Initiated Prayer in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District
In a case that evaded notice of many but is of central relevance
to the arguments herein nonetheless, especially with regard to the
relevance of the Court’s Religion Clauses jurisprudence to sports,
the Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari by a high school
football assistant coach who challenged the athletic director’s recommendation to not renew his employment contract on Free
Speech grounds.123 Bremerton School District did not rehire
Coach Joseph Kennedy, a public high school football coach, after
he ignored the district’s instruction to cease his public, post-game,
midfield prayers.124 What were once silent, post-game prayers by
120. See Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (analyzing Buddhist inmate’s claim upon denial of his cleric’s presence in execution chamber); Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (assessing
analogous claim of similarly situated Muslim).
121. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (reevaluating Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence).
122. See id. (continuing post-Lemon narrowing of Establishment Clause); Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1476–77 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting grant of application
of stay) (attempting to distinguish claims and timing of death penalty stay docket
Establishment Clause claims); Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (exhibiting post-Lemon narrowing
in death penalty stay context); Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 635 (Alito, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (telegraphing willingness to continue re-broadening Free Exercise Clause).
123. See Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 634 (denying discretionary review to Coach
Kennedy after his Ninth Circuit loss on Free Speech claims without opinion speaking for Court majority). While a Court majority remained silent on reasoning for
denial, an opinion speaking for four members of the Court—all that is needed to
grant certiorari—admonished the District Court’s “brief, informal,” and unclear
opinion delivered solely from the bench and the “even more imprecise” decision
from the Ninth Circuit for being so deficient as to require the Court “to vacate
[and remand] the decision below” had it come to the Court via its mandatory
jurisdiction. See id. at 636 (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.).
124. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 816–20 (9th Cir.
2017) (detailing history of Coach Kennedy’s weekly ritual). See also Reply Brief of
Appellant at *2, Joseph A. Kennedy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bremerton School District, Defendant-Appellee, 2017 WL 473818 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2017) (distinguishing
Coach Kennedy’s desired relief as “a silent prayer that lasts 15–30 seconds,” “not
seek[ing] to pray with students or while ‘surrounded by’ students”). Another reason
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himself at midfield escalated to “deliver[ing] a message containing
religious content” to “[s]tudents, coaches, and other attendees
from both teams [who] were invited to participate.”125 The
Bremerton School District Superintendent conveyed to Coach Kennedy via multiple letters over the course of six weeks that his actions
could cause reasonable observers to perceive the district as endorsing religion.126 Such an endorsement, the district feared, could be
sufficient for an Establishment Clause challenge.127
After the first letter, Coach Kennedy altered his post-game ritual by excising any religious content from his speeches and waiting
until the field started to clear to pray silently and alone at midfield.128 Several weeks into this new routine, Coach Kennedy
sought religious accommodation from the District via letter and informed the District he would restart his previous post-game prayer
practice two days later at the next football game, an announcement
he also made personally in local media appearances.129 While
the District did not rehire Kennedy was because he did not reapply despite his oneyear contract expiring. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 820 (explaining Kennedy never
reapplied and, more broadly, assistant football coaches’ routine one-year contract
process).
125. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 816 (describing evolution of Coach Kennedy’s postgame religious exercise). See also Brief of Appellee at *5–6, Kennedy, 2016 WL
7474748 (chronicling earlier stages of Kennedy’s prayer routine that occurred in
team’s locker-room).
126. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 817 (describing correspondence as recognizing
absence of malice but describing prayers as, nevertheless, “problematic” and suggesting permissible alternatives). See also Reply Brief of Appellant at *3, Kennedy,
2017 WL 473818 (responding on behalf of Coach Kennedy to Bremerton School
District’s concerns regarding such “problematic” prayer, arguing for absence of
“colorable claim” by describing how “no ‘objective observer’ would confuse Coach
Kennedy’s speech,” such as “ ‘ta[king] a knee at the 50-yard line’ after the game ‘to
say a silent prayer that lasts 15-30 seconds,’ ” with state endorsement of prayer).
127. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 817–20 (detailing repeated iterations of District’s
concerns and instructions to Coach Kennedy in three letters over six weeks); see
also Reply Brief of Appellant at *15–27, Kennedy, 2017 WL 473818 (presenting
Coach Kennedy’s argument that “only an actual violation” of Establishment Clause
would permit Bremerton School District’s course of action against him; arguing
mere trepidation of District’s attorneys to be insufficient to restrict his rights (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
128. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 817 (detailing Coach Kennedy’s new post-game
actions in response to District’s letter). See also Reply Brief of Appellant at *19,
Kennedy, 2017 WL 473818 (recounting Coach Kennedy’s description of his new
practice: “ ‘I waited until the BHS players were walking toward the stands to sing
the post-game fight song. Then I knelt at the 50-yeard line, closed my eyes, and
prayed a brief, silent prayer.’ ”).
129. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 818 (recounting Coach Kennedy’s written response to District). See also Brief of Appellee at *11, Kennedy, 2016 WL 7474748
(describing Kennedy’s lawyers’ response as indicating his prayer taking place “immediately after” the final whistle as “the only acceptable outcome”).
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there is a dispute as to the manner in which a multitude joined
Coach Kennedy at midfield when he resumed, band members’ parents complained to the District the multitude “knocked over” their
children, and Satanists informed the District they, too, would be
exercising their religion on the field after the next game “if others
were allowed to” as well.130 As a result of Coach Kennedy’s resumption and the reigning pandemonium it caused, the District then reexplained its policy to Coach Kennedy and, in a second letter to
him, “reiterated that it ‘can and will’ accommodate ‘religious exercise that would not be perceived as District endorsement, and
which does not otherwise interfere with the performance of job
duties.’ ”131
This offer of accommodation was not lip service: the District
offered him “ ‘a private location within the school building, athletic
facility or press box . . . for brief religious exercise before and after
games’ ” or “his prior practice of praying on the fifty-yard line after
the stadium had emptied,” and “invited Kennedy to offer his own
suggestions” for accommodation methods.132 After his lawyers conveyed to the District that Coach Kennedy found these measures inadequate, he again engaged in his post-game prayer ritual at the
subsequent football game, which caused the District to place him
on paid administrative leave for having violated its policies and instructions and, eventually, the athletic director to suggest during
annual evaluations to not renew his one-year contract—an unavailable option regardless because Kennedy did not reapply for the
opening.133 In short, the school district placed Kennedy on paid
administrative and the athletic director recommended to not rehire
130. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 818 (relating turmoil ensuing from Coach Kennedy’s resumed religious exercise). See also Brief of Appellee at *12, Kennedy, 2016
WL 7474748 (showing how District took steps to secure public safety with police
department after unrest; revealing Satanists donned their religious attire at next
game).
131. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 819 (reporting District’s efforts to accommodate
Coach Kennedy’s religious exercise). See also Brief of Appellee at *9–10, Kennedy,
2016 WL 7474748 (showing District “underscore[ed] that Kennedy’s coaching duties did not stop at the end of games, but instead included Kennedy’s supervision
of the players through the post-game ceremonies, post-game locker room activity,
and ‘until players are released to their parents or otherwise are allowed to
leave.’ ”).
132. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 819 (reporting District’s efforts to accommodate
Coach Kennedy’s religious exercise). See also Brief of Appellee at *11, Kennedy,
2016 WL 7474748 (reproducing letter to Coach Kennedy: “ ‘Development of accommodation is an interactive process, and should you wish to continue to engage
in private exercise while on the job, the District will be happy to discuss options for
that to occur in a manner that will not violate the law.’ ”).
133. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 819–20 (chronicling end of District’s employment of Coach Kennedy). See also Brief of Appellee at *12–13, Kennedy, 2016 WL
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him after contract expiration because he did not comply with its
general policy nor its specific-to-him instructions, which were an effort to avoid running afoul of the Establishment Clause.134 Coach
Kennedy then challenged that decision on Free Speech grounds
and pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.135
While the Court quietly denied the petition for writ of certiorari, one Justice not-so-quietly wrote regarding this denial.136 Justice Alito penned a concurrence to the denial of certiorari that
explicitly informed the petitioner, without provocation, despite the
denial of review of his Free Speech Clause claims that the coach
“still has live claims under the Free Exercise Clause . . . .”137 He was
not alone in this belief.138 Three other Justices signed on, bringing
the total with this belief, when including the author, to four—the
exact number required to grant certiorari should Coach Kennedy
amend his complaint to include Free Exercise claims and it then
percolate back up to the Supreme Court for review on those
amended grounds, allowing the Court another opportunity to continue its post-Smith re-broadening of the Free Exercise Clause.139
7474748 (elucidating annual evaluations process: all six assistant football coaches
only had one-year contract and all chose not to reapply).
134. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 819–20 (indicating why and how District “placed
[Coach Kennedy] on paid administrative leave” and its Athletic Director recommended Coach Kennedy’s one-year contract not be renewed). For further discussion of how the inter-clausal tension manifests in decisions like that of the
administrators here, see infra notes 171–232 and accompanying text.
135. See id. at 820–21 (outlining grounds of suit as limited to Free Speech
Clause and Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 claims and relief sought as injunction, reinstatement, and permission to continue post-game prayer ritual). Coach
Kennedy’s First Amendment claim is one of Free Speech Retaliation pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 821 n.5. Below, the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel
denied a preliminary injunction on that claim because it held Coach “Kennedy
spoke as a public employee, not as a private citizen,” and was, thus, ineligible for
the relief sought under Circuit precedent. See id. at 822 (citing Eng v. Cooley, 552
F.3d 1062, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2009)).
136. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019) (Alito, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
JJ.). Justice Alito acknowledged one of the primary reasons for denying certiorari
to Coach Kennedy’s Free Speech claims was the presence of “unresolved factual
questions” such as the District Court’s lack of “clear finding about what [Coach
Kennedy] was likely to be able to prove” and the Circuit Court’s “even more imprecise” opinion “on this critical point.” Id. at 635–36 (Alito, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.).
137. See id. at 637 (suggesting Court’s Free Speech jurisprudence “drastically
cut[ting] back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause” might have
influenced Kennedy to not advance Free Exercise claims here). Justice Alito also
indicated Kennedy’s Title VII claims were still live; however, these are less relevant
than those of Free Exercise to this Comment’s scope. See id.
138. See id. at 635 (enumerating Justices signing on to concurring opinion).
139. See id. at 637 (passing for now on consideration of Free Exercise Clause
claims because Court had “not been asked to revisit those decisions” limiting said
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2. Establishment Clause in American Legion v. American Humanist
Association
One of the Court’s biggest blockbusters this term was an Establishment Clause case.140 Maryland obtained the land circumscribed
by some of the state’s highly trafficked roads to (1) be better positioned to work towards lessening the danger of surrounding roads
and (2) become stewards of the aging monument found
thereon.141 The monument is in the shape of a cross.142 The cross
itself is thirty-two feet tall and sits atop a pedestal that is at least an
additional nine feet tall, which has thereon a plaque that commemorates forty-nine area men who lost their lives in World War I.143 In
holding the cross on public land did not violate the Establishment
Clause, the Court rejected the almost-fifty-year-old Lemon test—at
least insofar as the test’s application to Establishment Clause challenges to long-standing memorials.144 This rejection of the Lemon
clause). For further discussion of the Court’s past, post-Smith re-broadening of the
Free Exercise Clause, see supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. The Court
granted one petition for writ of certiorari that presents the opportunity to continue its post-Smith re-broadening of the Free Exercise Clause even before Coach
Kennedy, or another party, might offer the Court the same chance. See Fulton v.
City of Phila., 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020), granting cert. to, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019)
(challenging city’s conditions on eligibility for foster care participation to which
religious agency objected on religious grounds); Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Bd.,
435 P.3d 1 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 10, 2019) (concerning challenge to state agency’s denial of contractor license to applicant who
refused to comply with request for Social Security Number (SSN) because he believed SSNs are “a form of the mark, and in substance (essence) the number of the
2-horned beast written of in the Holy Bible”).
140. See generally Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019)
(considering Establishment Clause implications of long-established, Latin cross
monument veterans’ memorial on land Maryland purchased long after erection
thereof).
141. See id. at 2078 (listing reasons Maryland purchased land on which memorial stands).
142. See id. (describing monuments dimensions, shape, and features in
detail).
143. See id. (explaining nature and origins of memorial).
144. See id. at 2089–90 (finding no Establishment Clause violation because of
cross’ “added secular meaning” as war-dead memorial, “acquired historical importance,” and nature as memorial to “particular individuals” instead of, for example,
all fallen veterans of World War I); see id. at 2081–85 (considering four ways in
which Lemon fails to be appropriate for “commemorative . . . symbols”: (1) older
monuments’ purposes can be elusive; (2) there often exists more than one of
those purposes, and they can easily diverge over time; (3) monuments’ effect(s)
can also evolve; and (4) removal may exhibit stronger inhibition of religion than
advancement thereof its presence provides); see id. at 2087–89 (rejecting Lemon for
more case-specific and history-laden approach it previously adopted in its legislative prayer cases Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway). For further discussion of legislative prayer cases, see supra notes 99, 113–114 and
accompanying text.
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test as a “grand unified theory” for Establishment Clause jurisprudence echoed a pre-Lemon understanding of an absence of a “single
constitutional caliper against that can be used to measure the precise degree to which [Establishment Clause concerns] are present
or absent.”145
This anti-unification position garnered overlapping support
from a variety of justices; two agreed it was “a misadventure” and
had been “shelved,” another said it was “no longer applie[d],” and
yet another wrote it “could not resolve” the “great array of laws and
practices [before] the Court.”146 All but two of the justices wrote or
signed on to opinions that conceded Lemon was not applicable in
every Establishment Clause case, so while at least four members of
the American Legion Court seem prepared to scrap Lemon in contexts
other than old memorials, there were at least seven who believe
Lemon to be unfit for absolute duty.147 This contraction of the Establishment Clause mirrors the dilation of the Free Exercise Clause
as telegraphed by Justice Alito and three of his colleagues in the
Kennedy statement regarding denial of the writ of certiorari only
months before.148
3. Establishment Clause in Death Penalty Stay Docket
The Court further engaged with the Establishment Clause in
two cases from its death penalty stay application docket that underscore the lethality of the Court’s narrowing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and how that lethality discriminatorily cuts across
145. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (rejecting one-size-fits-all
Religion Clauses test).
146. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087 (decrying efforts of Court’s previous
attempt at area-defining test); id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (discussing
same); id. at 2101–02 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas,
J.) (discussing same).
147. See id. at 2080 (announcing support of all but Ginsburg and Sotomayor,
JJ. for Lemon’s fall from universal applicability in Establishment Clause cases); see
also, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (2005) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
Lemon as “not useful” when confronted with static, religious displays and embracing, instead, approaches grounded in history and display’s characteristics). For
further discussion of this earlier rejection of Lemon for display cases, see supra
notes 81–87 and accompanying text. While the Court did not discuss at length the
apparent rejection of Lemon in school prayer cases, one concurrence noted the
Court’s school prayer jurisprudence had not relied on Lemon but, instead, had
focused on the coercive effects of school prayer on impressionable students susceptible to the same. See id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)) (walking through Court’s lack of reliance on Lemon for
all “relevant categories of Establishment Clause cases,” including school prayer).
148. For further discussion of statement regarding denial of writ of certiorari
in Kennedy, see supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
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lines of race and religion.149 In the first of these two cases, that of
Dominique Ray, the Court vacated the stay the Eleventh Circuit had
placed on his execution for the sole expressed reason that Ray
waited too long to file—eighty-three days after the execution day
was set and ten days before the execution.150 However, the dissent
elucidates the delay was much shorter when considering Ray’s warden did not inform Ray of the denial of the request for the presence of his spiritual advisor in the execution chamber until seventyeight days after the date was set and fifteen days before the execution.151 Additionally, the dissent adds, Ray then filed his claim only
five days later.152 In the second case, Patrick Murphy was also denied the presence of his spiritual advisor in the execution chamber.153 He filed a stay application, which the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas denied, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.154 The Court then reversed the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance
of denial of stay, but, unlike in Ray’s case, the Court, here, refrained from providing a rationale.155
Despite the similar claims in the two applications for review of
stay decisions by circuit courts, the Court vacated the stay the Eleventh Circuit had placed on the execution of Dominique Ray and,
only seven weeks later, reversed the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a stay
on the execution of Patrick Murphy.156 If the claims remained constant while the outcome was changed, another variable would be
149. See Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019) (reversing denial of execution stay on Establishment Clause grounds), rev’d, 919 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2019);
Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (vacating execution stay on Establishment
Clause grounds), rev’d, 915 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2019).
150. See Ray, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (articulating only one reason for vacating Eleventh Circuit’s stay: delay).
151. See id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (dispelling with notion that cause of
delay rested solely—or even primarily—on Ray’s shoulders).
152. See id. (illustrating Ray’s response to warden’s denial was far from
dawdling).
153. See Murphy v. Collier, 376 F. Supp. 3d 734 (S.D. Tex. 2019), aff’d 919
F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2019) (detailing Murphy’s Establishment Clause, Free Exercise
Clause, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
claims), rev’d 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019).
154. See generally Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (providing subsequent history).
155. See id. (requiring without rationale presence of Murphy’s spiritual advisor or one of his religion but of state’s choosing to be present in execution chamber), rev’d, 919 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2019).
156. See id. at 1475 (2019) (granting application for stay of execution after
Fifth Circuit affirmed trial court’s denial of stay); Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (granting
application to vacate stay of execution after Eleventh Circuit granted stay despite
trial court’s denial thereof).
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implicated in the search for an outcome determinative factor; here,
the facts provided that difference.157
While the stay for Murphy did not itself delve into these differences, Justice Kavanaugh, writing for himself and Chief Justice Roberts, wrote separately to explain why they voted for Murphy’s stay
and against Ray’s less than two months earlier and to address Justice Alito’s dissent, which both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
joined, from granting Murphy’s stay.158 The first difference to
which Justice Kavanaugh points was that while Murphy raised an
“equal-treatment” claim himself, the Eleventh Circuit raised sua
sponte the same claim in Ray’s case.159 That is, even though the
same claim was relied on in Ray’s case, his stay application was denied because Ray did not himself raise the claim.160 The second
difference to which Justice Kavanaugh points was the difference in
the relief sought underlying each stay application.161 Even if Ray
had advanced an “equal-treatment” claim himself, Justice Kavanaugh argued the remedy would not have been inclusion of a spiritual advisor of his religion but rather “removing of ministers of all
religions from the execution room . . . .”162 To receive the remedy
sought, Ray would have needed to succeed under a different
claim—the exact claim he advanced below and the advancement of
which, Justice Kavanaugh also wrote, was the basis for the first dispositive distinction between these cases, precipitating the denial.163
The third and final difference Justice Kavanaugh highlighted was
timing.164 Murphy’s petition to Texas for the presence of a spiritual advisor of his religion one month prior to his execution date
and the state’s subsequent silence was distinguishable, Justice Kavanaugh wrote, from Ray’s respective application, which came too
157. See Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1476–77 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting grant of application of stay) (enumerating “several significant differences” between Ray and Murphy’s claims).
158. See id. at 1476–85 (disagreeing over whether Murphy’s case was different
enough from Ray’s case to draw outcome determinative distinctions).
159. See id. at 1476–77 (acknowledging grant of stay was based on “equal-treatment” claim but concluding Eleventh Circuit ought not have, of its own volition,
based granting stay thereon).
160. See id. (noting Ray failed to put forward this type of claim in either district or circuit court).
161. See id. at 1477 (distinguishing relief from “equal-treatment” claim from
what Alabama claims is regular relief to Ray’s claim under RLUIPA).
162. Id. (citation omitted) (presenting as dispositive Ray’s claim’s remedy as
removal of all spiritual advisors and Murphy’s as inclusion of his).
163. See id. at 1476–77 (arguing only RLUIPA claim was source of one inconsistency between Ray’s and Murphy’s claims and solution of another).
164. See id. (highlighting implicitly growing concern for perceived use of stay
applications by persons on death row as Hail Mary passes).
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late.165 Ray’s and Murphy’s cases illustrate the lethal effect of the
Court so drastically narrowing the Establishment Clause and how
that significant erosion of fundamental constitutional protection
subsequently empowers Justices to rely on the hollow claim of procedural minutia, alleged time delays here, when that lethality discriminatorily cuts across lines of race and religion.166
III. CARTILAGINOUS JOINTS: AN ADAPTIVE ANALYSIS
The Court ought to resurrect its test that best struck the proper
balance of the inter-clausal tension between the two Religion
Clauses: Lee v. Weisman.167 The Court could accomplish this end by
abandoning its post-Smith re-broadening of the Free Exercise
Clause and post-Lemon narrowing of the Establishment Clause and
re-adopting its Lee formulation that “the principle that government
may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede
the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause.”168 Unlike the tests explored in this Comment’s background that have oscillated and bent close over the years, this test
from Lee allows for less variation while not completely adopting immovability, allowing still for some “play in the joints” without sacrificing the Establishment Clause on the altar of Free Exercise.169
This section discusses in turn the effects of the Court’s Religion
Clause trajectory and need for course correction on (1) coaches
and teachers, (2) administrators, and (3) student-athletes before,
finally, turning to the impact on these groups—both on religion as
such and on its intersection with race—as portended by the recent
death penalty stay docket cases specifically.170
165. See id. (placing blame for delay in Murphy’s case on Texas and same in
Ray’s on him); but cf. Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 662 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (illumining warden’s role in delay in Ray’s case).
166. For further discussion of how this selective incorporation could affect
student-athletes, coaches, and administrators along these same lines of race and
religion, see infra notes 221–232 and accompanying text.
167. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
168. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
169. See id. (postulating Free Exercise claims cannot be allowed to override
those of Establishment Clause “at a minimum”). For further discussion of how
such overriding was allowed in Court’s history of Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses before Lee, see supra notes 27–42, 58–70 and accompanying text.
170. For further discussion of effect on coaches and teaches, see infra notes
171–198 and accompanying text. For further discussion of effect on administrators, see infra notes 199–210 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
effect on student-athletes, see infra notes 211–218 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of predictions based on recent cases from death penalty stay
docket, see infra notes 221–232 and accompanying text.
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A. Ribs: Effect on the Coaches and Teachers, Protectors of
Schools’ Vital Organs
After a heart-wrenching overtime defeat in the 2019 Sweet Sixteen, University of Tennessee Men’s Basketball Coach Rick Barnes
spoke candidly to his team in the locker room, concluding his remarks by saying to his team, “Let’s get it in. Come on. Let’s get it
in as a family. Come on.”171 He then got down on one knee,
joined hands with his players in a circle of them doing the same,
and initiated the Lord’s Prayer in which his student-athletes
joined.172 This was not merely a spur-of-the-moment plea to the
divine in a moment of great loss; instead, it was the culmination of a
long-term emphasis by Coach Barnes on Christianity by way of, inter
alia, “ ‘power talks’. . .focus[ed] on faith.”173 The fruits of this focus
have manifested in both player baptisms and Christianity-themed
tattoos.174 Although the Circuit in which Coach Barnes’ university
sits and the Sweet Sixteen game was played has not yet ruled definitively on coach-involved school prayer, the Third and Fifth Circuits
have, and they would not bode well for Coach Barnes if courts treat
him like the high and middle school coaches at the center of those
cases.175
The Fifth Circuit case is closest in analogy to Coach Barnes’
hypothetical case.176 The Third Circuit case is closest in analogy to
171. Tennessee Basketball (@Vol_Hoops), TWITTER (Mar. 29, 2019, 12:39
AM), https://twitter.com/Vol_Hoops/status/1111487937827364864?s=20 [https:/
/perma.cc/FZ8G-6QL8] (providing video of post-game locker room talk and
prayer).
172. See id. (progressing through video to eventual prayer).
173. See WBIR Staff and Russell Biven, Audience of One: Vols’ Faith Lifts Basketball Team to Greater Heights, 10NEWS, https://www.wbir.com/article/sports/college/vols/audience-of-one-vols-faith-lifts-basketball-team-to-greater-heights/5187fb62af-d1af-4e85-be13-feb17ce51690 [https://perma.cc/6EA6-V22B] (last updated Mar. 18, 2019, 2:53 PM) (showing video of Lord’s Prayer earlier in season).
174. See id. (showing pictures and chronicling stories of tattoos and baptisms).
175. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153,
174–79 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding constitutional school district’s policy against high
school football coach’s participation in student-initiated prayer, recognizing district’s “legitimate educational interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violations”) (citing Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995)); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1995))
(finding violation of Establishment Clause when middle school basketball coach’s
initiated and participated in his team’s prayers, violating Lemon’s prohibition on “excessive entanglement” and later bans on “endorsement”).
176. Compare Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995)
(regarding middle school basketball coach leading team in Lord’s prayer), with
WBIR Staff & Biven, supra note 173 (concerning college basketball coach leading
team in Lord’s prayer). The biggest caveat to this claim is that the Court has
viewed the adult status of, for example, legislators to be a significant factor when
assessing the coercive power of legislative prayer. See, e.g., Town of Greece, N.Y. v.
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the Ninth Circuit case, Kennedy, discussed at length above.177 At
issue in the Fifth Circuit was a nearly twenty-year tradition of the
middle school girls’ basketball coach initiating and or participating
in recitations of the Lord’s prayer “in each basketball practice[,]. . .
in the locker rooms before games began, after games in the center
of the basketball court in front of spectators, and on the school bus
travelling to and from basketball games.”178 The Third Circuit case
concerned a high school football coach, who led his team in a similar pre-game prayer for twenty-three seasons.179 Both the Third
and Fifth Circuits held these actions, indeed, violated the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.180 Moreover, neither Circuit
validated the respective coach’s Free Exercise claim.181 Instead, the
Fifth Circuit balanced the school district employees’ free exercise
rights against the commands of the Establishment Clause and
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (attempting to distinguish from school-prayerat-high-school-graduation case by arguing coercive factors present there are absent
in legislatures); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (reasoning adults are
“presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination’ or peer pressure”)
(internal citation omitted). Whether the Court will reason similarly in sportsprayer cases is yet to be seen, but it has appeared to recognize some difference in
college students; however, the case was limited to the context of federal funds used
for construction expenses. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)
(showing funding was narrowed to exclude use of facilities for religious purposes).
Nevertheless, the likely life-changing benefit a sports scholarship confers on a student-athlete must be factored into the coercion calculus when determining
whether, for example, student-athletes’ belief they could lose such a monumental
benefit if not taking part in a religious exercise flows from a sufficiently coercive
act by the university to trigger Establishment Clause protections. C.f. Santa Fe Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding high school students were impermissibly coerced during school-sponsored prayer at football game even if, unlike in
Lee, attendance was voluntary).
177. Compare Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153
(3d Cir. 2008) (centering on high school football coach leading team in prayer),
with Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017) (assessing high
school coach leading team in prayer). For further discussion of Kennedy’s facts, see
supra notes 123–139 and accompanying text.
178. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 404 (describing coach’s prayer
routine and treatment of Petitioner, who endured, inter alia, her history teacher
calling “a ‘little atheist’ ” for not participating in Lord’s prayer).
179. See Borden, 523 F.3d at 159–60 (illustrating past practice of Coach Borden
at pre-game meals and in locker room).
180. See id. at 174, 176–79 (finding Coach Borden’s actions impermissible
under Establishment Clause); Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 406–07 (ruling coach’s prayers infringe on student-athletes’ Establishment Clause rights).
181. See Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 406–07 (denying relief for Free
Exercise claims of each coach because of “improper[ ] entangle[ment]” and “endorsement”); see also Borden, 523 F.3d at 174 n.17 (revealing Borden did not even
originally raise Free Exercise claim). For a further discussion of Borden and Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., see supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text.
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found the former wanting.182 Because permitting its employees to
participate in student prayers would lead to both “endorsement”
and “excessive entanglement,” the Fifth Circuit held the employees’
Free Exercise claims were outweighed by the Establishment Clause
values that would otherwise be compromised.183
The Third Circuit quoted and cited a portion of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, including a quote from the Supreme Court in Lee,
where the Court held:
The principle that government may accommodate the
free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.
It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which “establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.”184
This was the Court’s synthesis of its Religion Clauses jurisprudence: the Establishment Clause shall not be sacrificed on the altar
of the Free Exercise Clause.185 This is consistent with the text of
182. See Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 406 (quoting Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)) (affirming district court’s enjoining of employees from
participating in student prayer).
183. See id. (synthesizing various Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases,
relying especially on Lemon). Endorsement runs afoul of one of the rules handed
down in Court’s religious display cases. See Cty. Of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989). “Endorsement” could also be assessed as a
synthesis of Lemon’s first and second prongs: (1) “a secular legislative purpose” and
(2) a “principle or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 at 612 (1971). Similarly, an absence of “ ‘excessive government entanglement with religion’ ” is Lemon’s third prong. See id. at
613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
184. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)) (striking proper constitutional balance between Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses). It is important to note the Lee Court did not fashion this formulation of the Religion Clauses out of whole cloth; rather, it is part of a long line of
precedent that affirms this relationship between the clauses. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (“[T]he Free Exercise
Clause . . . has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to
practice its beliefs.”).
185. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (asserting Free Exercise claims cannot run roughshod over Establishment Clause ones). For further discussion of the history of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses before Lee, see supra notes 27–42, 58–70
and accompanying text. The Trinity Lutheran Court described Missouri’s categorical denial of playground re-surfacing materials to religious institutions as “nothing
more than the state’s policy preference for skating as far as a possible from religious establishment concerns.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017). While this Comment’s normative argument
to return to Lee is supported by more than avoiding establishment concerns only
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the Religion Clauses, which forbid any “law respecting the establishment of religion” but then only proscribes those “prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”186 That is, because “respecting” is both
broader and more capacious than “prohibiting”, the Establishment
Clause could be seen—at least textually—to be correspondingly
broader than the Free Exercise Clause.187
Moreover, the Court has recognized for more than seventy-five
years the history and structure of the Bill of Rights supports construing the First Amendment’s protections as especially protected
against majoritarian hijacking: “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts.”188 Support for this understanding of the Religion Clauses’
inter-clausal tension also flows from precedent because the Court
has for more than half a century recognized the limits of the Free
Exercise Clause: “While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits
the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone,
it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the
State to practice its beliefs,” and a broader Establishment Clause
would also bring with it a benefit to all while the Free Exercise
Clause primarily benefits only those with some religion to exerfor the sake of doing so, such a practice is, contrary to the Court’s apparent disdain, laudable; there is inherent wisdom therein. See id. at 2040–41 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (“The constitutional provisions of thirty-nine
States—all but invalidated today—the weighty interests they protect, and the history they draw on deserve more than this judicial brush aside.”). Trinity Lutheran’s
dissenters warn of what this could portend, referencing concurrences that would
invalidate similar provisions that limit state contributions for religious use or forbidding distinctions for “religious status” altogether. See id. at 2041 n.14
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.). Seventy years earlier, the Court
recognized the Establishment Clause adamantly forbade such state funding of religion. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion.”).
186. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing text of Constitution’s Religion
Clauses).
187. See id. (using different language to address Congressional limits on religion-related laws); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (“A law may be ‘respecting’ the forbidden
objective while falling short of its total realization.”). This capacity is what prevents
the Establishment Clause from becoming a mere nullity when the government acts
at issue impermissibly favor religion but, nevertheless, fall short of officially establishing a state religion. See id. (“A given law might not establish a state religion but
nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end in the sense of being a step that could
lead to such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.”).
188. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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cise.189 Additionally, broadening the Establishment Clause would
also temper the cyclical politicization of the Free Exercise Clause,
which was championed by more liberal courts for the sake of religious minorities and then picked up by more conservative courts for,
primarily, the sake of white Christians.190 Under such a test—the
one cited by both the Third and Fifth Circuits, Coaches Barnes’ and
Kennedy’s Free Exercise claims would not fare well.191 However,
another test could be salvation for such claims.192
These are the kinds of claims that Justice Alito’s statement concurring in the denial of certiorari of Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.
could supply with legal ammunition should a lawsuit arise.193 Specifically, and hypothetically, counsel to Coaches Barnes and Kennedy could cite the “live claims under the Free Exercise Clause”
language from Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by three other
members of the Court, in Coach Kennedy’s case with the confidence that, barring any so-called vehicle problems, there is a reasonable probability for Supreme Court review—a grant that only
takes four votes, which Justice Alito’s concurrence possessed.194
While it may be somewhat less crystalline to predict exactly how
each of the four Justices who espoused this belief would vote on the
merits and whether such an opinion could garner a Court majority,
it would appear Coach Barnes, with the benefit of Coach Kennedy’s
hindsight, would be able to make a claim to which a sufficient ma189. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 (rejecting Free Exercise Clause’s use as tool to
impose majority’s beliefs on others).
190. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking down state
prohibition on unemployment benefits for unwillingness to work on Sabbath of
petitioner, one Seventh Day Adventist), with Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(wielding Establishment Clause to open state aid program to petitioner, one mainline Christian church).
191. Compare Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (articulating test that weighs Establishment
Clause as heavier than Free Exercise Clause), with WBIR Staff & Biven, supra note
173 (reporting facts similar to Duncanville Sch. Dist., which Fifth Circuit used Lee to
invalidate), and Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017)
(presenting facts similar to Borden, which Third Circuit used Lee to invalidate by
following Lee’s emphasis on importance of students’ Establishment Clause rights as
protection against coach’s Free Exercise Clause claims).
192. For further discussion of evolving nature of Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence, see supra notes 43–53, 123–139 and accompanying text.
193. Compare WBIR Staff & Biven, supra note 173 (concerning college basketball coach who frequently led his team in prayer on school premises), with Kennedy,
869 F.3d 813 (regarding high school football coach who frequently led his team in
prayer on school premises).
194. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637, denying cert. to,
869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (suggesting without provocation Coach
Kennedy retained “live claims under the Free Exercise Clause”).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss2/2

36

England: Justices Answer Coach Kennedy's Prayer With Play In The Joints Au

2020]

JUSTICES ANSWER COACH KENNEDY’S PRAYER

243

jority of the Court would be amenable to secure review.195 That the
Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence post-Smith exhibits a significant re-broadening trend only strengthens a hypothetical
Barnes or additional Kennedy claim to any adverse employment action.196 Of course, Coaches Barnes and Kennedy are not the only
coaches who could potentially take advantage of Justice Alito’s helpful hint and the Court’s re-broadening Free Exercise jurisprudence.197 Rather, all similarly situated coaches would have their
legal positions similarly fortified if bringing similar litigation.198
B. Spine: Effect on Administrators, Schools’ Backbones and
Nerve Centers
Not only have the Court’s re-broadening the Free Exercise
Clause and signals of continuing that trend altered the calculus in
cases like Coach Kennedy’s, but the Court’s narrowing of the Establishment Clause has done so as well.199 At the intersection of Relig195. For further discussion of Kennedy, see supra notes 123–139 and accompanying text. While those four Justices have telegraphed the likelihood of their vote
for review that would be sufficient for granting certiorari, four others have already
announced their skepticism of “turning the First Amendment into a sword[ ] and
using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy . . . in such an aggressive
way” in the Free Speech Clause context, and there is no reason to believe such
caution would not equally be applied at the merits stage by those Justices in the
Free Exercise Clause context. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun.
Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (sounding alarm against weaponization of First
Amendment against regulations).
196. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Col. Civil Rights Comm’n., 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (rejecting animus found in state civil rights commission’s hearing for
baker who refused to bake specifically for same-sex wedding); Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (challenging state’s
policy of excluding religious institutions from public funding for playground resurfacing); City Of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (seeking building permit
for expansion of urban Catholic church after being denied); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (arguing against city
ordinance proscribing ritual animal slaughter). For further discussion of this postSmith re-broadening trend, see supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153,
174–79 (3d Cir. 2008) (displaying similarly situated football coach); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1995) (showing similarly
situated basketball coach).
198. See Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 637 (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari,
joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (offering without provocation
several potential relief opportunities for complaints reformulated to include
claims other than Free Speech).
199. For further discussion of how Court has narrowed Establishment Clause
post-Lemon, see supra notes 71–87, 123–139.
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ion Clause cases are administrators.200 There, they have to walk the
fine line of allowing employees and students to freely exercise their
religion while also ensuring such allowances are not so permissive
so as to transform into an Establishment Clause claim due to reasonably perceived endorsement or excessive entanglement.201 This
tight rope act—one that must be walked while simultaneously carrying out the vital task of overseeing students’ education—was articulated by the Bremerton School District administrators in Kennedy.202
There, they provided as one rationale for their discipline of Coach
Kennedy their fear his actions would cause a reasonable observer to
believe the district was endorsing religion in contravention of the
Establishment Clause.203 Without doing so explicitly, the school
district engaged in the type of balancing of interests envisioned by
Lee, where the Court articulated a test that favored the Establishment Clause when Free Exercise claims were pitted against it.204 If
the district’s counsel surveyed precedent for what test to apply, this
would have been exactly what they found: Lee as applied by both the
Third and Fifth Circuits.205 However, this calculus becomes altogether different if the Court’s narrowing of the Establishment
200. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 816–20 (9th Cir.
2017) (retelling how administrators handled incident from position between employees and students).
201. See, e.g., id. at 817 (recounting Bremerton School District’s balancing of
constitutional obligations).
202. See id. (reproducing and summarizing correspondence between district
and Coach Kennedy). If the Court readopted it’s test from Lee, which is clearer
and strikes the proper balance between Establishment and Free Exercise interests,
administrators would be able to deal more confidently and swiftly with these matters, allowing them more time to devote to overseeing students’ education. See id.
at 817–19 (detailing District’s concerns and time spent writing Coach Kennedy on
multiple occasions as well as communications and organizing with local police for
security after Kennedy’s resumption of his post-game practice).
203. See id. at 817 (elucidating how district communicated to Coach Kennedy
its obligation to prevent reasonably perceived endorsement).
204. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (announcing test that prefers “fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause” over free exercise claims). In Kennedy, the implicit application of Lee meant the district’s
weighing as constitutionally heavier the Establishment Clause rights of the many
potentially susceptible students over that of the singular coach, who could practice
similar conduct in ways less likely to send the message to a reasonable high school
student-athlete that the district endorsed Coach Kennedy’s religion (that is, advanced it for the purpose thereof). See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 816–20 (showing District’s constitutional calculus).
205. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d
Cir. 2008) (endorsing Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist.’s embrace of Lee’s preference for
Establishment Clause); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir.
1995) (embracing Lee’s preference for Establishment Clause).
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Clause continues because the limitations imposed thereby would be
correlatively narrowed.206
This is exactly what happened at the end of the Court’s most
recently completed term, which concluded in June 2019, when the
Court continued its trend of narrowing the Establishment Clause by
permitting a more-than-forty-feet-tall, cross-shaped World War I veterans memorial on state-owned land surrounded by a busy intersection.207 By perpetuating the Court’s post-Lemon trend of narrowing
the Establishment Clause, the Court likely lessened the need for
administrators like those in Bremerton School District to fear Establishment Clause claims upon allowing employees like Coach Kennedy to engage in his public prayer practice.208 Put another way, if
the Court lessens the possibility of Establishment Clause litigation,
the equilibrium of administrators balancing between the Religion
Clauses shifts toward the Free Exercise Clause.209 This would usher
in more lenient administrators and, as a result, more latitude for
employees—including coaches.210
C. Growth Plates: Effect on Student-Athletes, Malleable But
Integral Components
While a significant portion of the Court has tipped its hand at
the future of cases of students objecting to the religious nature of
their coach’s conduct, it remains less clear how a reformulating of
the relationship of the Religion Clauses to one another might affect
students wishing to engage in religious activity.211 Given (1) the
increased latitude employees will likely gain if, or more likely when,
the Court re-broadens the Free Exercise Clause even further and
(2) the already significant latitude granted students relative to their
coaches, it would follow students’ Free Exercise rights will only in206. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (defining as relevant to Establishment Clause’s
weight “fundamental limitations” therefrom).
207. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (describing monument at issue). For further discussion of “Peace Cross” case, see supra
notes 140–148 and accompanying text.
208. For further discussion of how Court has narrowed Establishment Clause
post-Lemon but pre-Am. Legion, see supra notes 71–87.
209. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (providing test that strengthens Free Exercise
claims if Establishment Clause is weakened).
210. Cf. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 816–20 (9th Cir.
2017) (showing limited administrator leniency and employee latitude when Establishment Clause concerns are higher).
211. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019)
(Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (acknowledging potential for Coach to bring Free Exercise claim).
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crease as well.212 This sounds in line with the clarion call for the
preservation of student rights in Tinker.213 This time, perhaps ensuring students’ rights are not checked at the stadium gate.214
However, the Establishment Clause rights administrators weighed
in the above section were those very same rights equally possessed
by students if Tinker is to be followed.215
Faced with this conundrum, it would appear that all parties at
schools are gaining Free Exercise latitude, albeit at the expense of
Establishment Clause protections.216 Students are not significantly
different in either this gain or resulting loss.217 Thus, students’
rights and those of all parties at schools are following the greater
trend across Religion Clause applications: a re-broadening Free Exercise Clause and narrowing Establishment Clause.218 As formulated in Lee, a re-broadened Free Exercise Clause ought to be met
with a correlatively broad Establishment Clause, not the narrowed
one the Court has whittled down.219 Only a broad Establishment
Clause will be able to protect the rights of student-athletes seeking
to be protected from undue religious influence from their coaches
and, indeed, adequate protection against state action that would
impermissibly inhibit their own religion as well.220
212. See, e.g., Kennedy, 869 F.3d 813, 817 (describing District policy of already
permitting students leeway “to engage in private, non-disruptive prayer”).
213. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (heralding
bevy of constitutional rights preserved to children even when at school).
214. See id. at 506 (announcing famously that schoolchildren do not “shed
their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate”).
215. See id. (reserving rights to teachers and students alike).
216. Compare id. (failing to distinguish between those rights preserved as between teachers and students), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1982) (setting
up zero sum game between Religion Clauses), and Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 637 (Alito,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
JJ.) (telegraphing continued re-broadening of Free Exercise Clause).
217. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (ruling neither teachers nor students were
subject to having rights stripped at school).
218. For further discussion of these trends in Religion Clause jurisprudence,
see supra notes 27–116 and accompanying text.
219. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)) (striking proper constitutional balance between Religion Clauses’ interclausal tension).
220. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. of
Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)) (laying out second prong
that not only protects against advancement of religion but also, importantly and
masterfully, against inhibition thereof). A partial solution to this conundrum may
be found in the related work of a legal scholar who recently explored how members of minority religious groups have sought to take advantage of the Court’s
significant and sustained erosion of the Establishment Clause. See Jay Wexler, OUR
NON-CHRISTIAN NATION (2019) (chronicling, inter alia, trip of author to Minnesota
town that granted Satanists’ petition to erect veterans’ monument in town-established free speech zone on public land only to rescind by de-creating free speech
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D. Sternal Angle: Applicability of Death Penalty Selectivity,
Connecting Joints
Thus far, most of the distinctions herein have pitted the Religion Clauses against one another to highlight the disparity in emphasis between them.221 However, there are another set of
disparities perhaps more glaring and certainly more important.222
The Court’s death penalty stay docket is, here, revealing.223 The
same prejudices that have caused those who have been sentenced
to death to receive from the Court disparate treatment on the basis
of race and religion are unlikely to be absent when the Court decides other Religion Clause cases, which could be enforced in similarly disparate ways in a variety of contexts—including public
school sports.224
If the Court’s Religion Clauses jurisprudence as reflected in its
death penalty stay docket is extended to other contexts, it should be
expected that questions of Free Exercise in the realm of sports—
like the one Coach Kennedy and those similarly situated can apparently raise—could be decided according to which religion one is
seeking to exercise.225 Similarly, questions about the Establishment
Clause could come down to which religion the state is endorsing.226
Students and teachers have previously been accorded a more expansive set of rights, or at least a more weighty measure of interests
zone after monument was commissioned and completed but before installation).
Specifically, the scholar argued “non-Christians who want to participate in public
life are right to push for access to the public square and should continue to demand their equal place there;” however, this does little—if not nothing—for those
students not wishing to engage in public life and places an affirmative burden,
here, on the parties with less power: students, especially non-Christian ones. See id.
(arguing for civic inclusion of minority religions’ practitioners).
221. For further discussion of the Religion Clauses’ relationships to one another, see supra notes 184–187 and accompanying text.
222. For further discussion of potential disparities, see supra notes 149–165
and accompanying text.
223. For further discussion of the Court’s death penalty stay docket, see supra
notes 149–165 and accompanying text.
224. For further discussion of the disparate treatment on the basis of race and
religion evinced by death penalty stay docket, see supra notes 149–165 and accompanying text.
225. See Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019) (reversing denial of execution stay on Establishment Clause grounds for white Buddhist), rev’d, 919 F.3d 913
(5th Cir. 2019); Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (vacating execution stay on
Establishment Clause grounds for Black Muslim), rev’d, 915 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.
2019).
226. See id. (illustrating religious disparities).
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than those sentenced to death, so there is reason to believe the
breadth of these disparities could be even greater here.227
Religion was not, however, the only dispositive disparity present in the Court’s death penalty stay docket in the October 2018
Term; race, too, proved ostensibly dispositive.228 Questions of Free
Exercise, then, could turn on the race of the individual seeking to
practice, and Establishment Clause cases could turn on what race
the practitioners of the endorsed religion are as opposed to that of
the challengers.229 At least one member of the Court has recognized preferential treatment to some classes of litigants is present
over others, specifically highlighting the Court’s denial to consider
Murphy’s case, “where the risk of irreparable harm is the loss of
life.”230 Later in the same case, one where the Court granted an
emergency application to stay a district court’s injunction on the
Department of Homeland Security’s “public charge rule,” this same
Justice explained how the Court’s “concerns over quick decisions
wither when prodded by the Government in far less compelling circumstances,” noting this “disparity in treatment erodes the fair and
balanced decision making process this Court must strive to protect.”231 If this pattern holds true for the Court’s impending opportunity to reexamine Smith and subsequent application in the sports
context, perhaps Christian coaches will be more successful in asserting Free Exercise claims or white athletes more successful in their
Establishment Clause claims; Murphy’s and Ray’s cases foreshadow
227. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(including students and teachers in group who do not forgo rights by being in
school), with Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (vacating stay of execution that was based on
Establishment Clause claim of man refused presence of his spiritual advisor in execution chamber). This would not be the Court’s first foray into preying on the
vulnerable; rather, such a continued erosion of rights for society’s most vulnerable
would be par for the course for the post-Warren Supreme Court. See Adam Cohen,
Supreme Inequality: The Supreme Court’s Fifty-Year Battle for a More Unjust America,
(2020) (arguing, since 1969, Supreme Court has lurched toward big money interests and away from liberty and equality for already susceptible populations).
228. See Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (reversing denial of execution stay on Establishment Clause grounds for white Buddhist); Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (vacating execution stay on Establishment Clause grounds for Black Muslim).
229. Compare Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (imposing stay on execution of white
man), with Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (vacating Eleventh Circuit’s stay on execution of
similarly situated Black man).
230. See Wolf v. Cook Cty., Ill., 140 S. Ct. 681, 684 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari) (citing Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1481 (Alito, J., dissenting from grant of stay)); Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661) (contrasting Court’s permissive stance
on Government’s stay applications with its much less permissive one, generally,
and even more intolerant one for capital defendants).
231. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari) (analyzing Court’s
response to Government’s application for emergency review over “20-year status
quo in one State” here with Court’s response to execution stay applications).
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this potential disparate treatment on the basis of religion and
race.232
IV. FIBROUS JOINTS: AN UNBENDING CONCLUSION
Four members of the Supreme Court have telegraphed their
belief that the Court is ready to both narrow the Establishment
Clause and broaden the Free Exercise Clause.233 If this happens,
student-athletes, coaches, and administrators alike will enjoy
greater Free Exercise latitude—a benefit only to those who are religious—and lessened Establishment Clause protections—a detriment to all those who are not of the state’s endorsed religion.234
For Coach Kennedy, this would mean his public, post-game, midfield prayers may be reinstated due to increased protection for
some by the expanded Free Exercise Clause.235 For Bremerton
School District, this would mean looser regulations due to diminished fear of Establishment Clause suits.236 However, when coaches
are practicing a religion other than the most prominent or politically acceptable one in a community or the coach is not white, will
the Court be as sympathetic?237 When Ray’s and Murphy’s cases are
juxtaposed, it would appear not.238
232. For a further discussion of Ray and Murphy, see supra notes 149–165 and
accompanying text. These two cases also foreshadow the grave consequences that
can flow therefrom. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943) (“Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters.”).
233. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (narrowing Establishment Clause and signaling willingness of at least four to go further);
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (illustrating readiness to expand Free Exercise Clause even further).
234. For further discussion of the effect of these trends on student-athletes,
coaches, and administrators, see supra notes 171–218 and accompanying text.
235. For further discussion of Coach Kennedy’s case, see supra notes 123–139
and accompanying text.
236. For further discussion of effect on Bremerton School District and other
administrators, see supra notes 199–210.
237. For further discussion of potential disparities, see supra notes 149–165
and accompanying text. Recall, this majoritarian tyranny was exactly that against
which the Barnette Court warned was the antithesis of the Religion Clauses: “The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
238. For further discussion of Ray and Murphy, see supra notes 149–165 and
accompanying text. The Court has warned against the “compulsory unification”
towards which these cases help illustrate it now trends; it should, here, heed its
own, grave warning: “Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (explaining why national unity justification for compulsion in Court’s decision of Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
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How far is the Court willing to broaden the Free Exercise
Clause—just wide enough to let Christians in and no more?239
How far is the Court willing to narrow the Establishment Clause—
just too narrow for a forty-foot tall Latin cross and no more?240 For
Coach Kennedy, the student-athletes he coached, Bremerton
School District, and all student-athletes, coaches, and public-school
administrators throughout the country of any or no religion at all
and of any race to be equally and adequately protected by the Religion Clauses, Free Exercise must apply to more than Christian
coaches, Establishment must apply to Christian symbols, and student-athletes—including those coached by Coach Kennedy—must
not be forced to “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the [stadium] gate.”241
Samuel England*
310 U.S. 586 (1940) is constitutionally impermissible). It also derived a “lesson”
from “such attempts to compel coherence” in such a matter: “ultimate futility.” See
id. (pointing to maligned efforts of Roman Empire’s anti-Christian actions, the
Inquisition, and Russian state’s exiles to Siberia as evidence of compulsion’s “ultimate futility”).
239. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019)
(Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (signaling willingness to allow for continuation of Christian prayers).
This Free-Exercise-for-me-but-not-for-thee conception of the Religion Clauses
stands in contravention to how the Court had traditionally viewed the Free Exercise Clause: “While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.” See Sch. Dist.
of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
240. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (permitting monument in shape of Christian symbol).
241. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 512–13
(1969) (making analogous claim about “schoolhouse gate”; extending students’
rights beyond classroom to include “on the playing field”). For further discussion
of normative claims, see supra notes 184–187 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2017, University of Tennessee. This Comment is dedicated to my greatgrandparents, Allyene and Roy, without whom none of this would have been possible as well as to the rest of my family whose love knows no limiting principles. I am
also grateful to the staff of the Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal for their feedback
throughout the editing and publication process.
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